OPINION: At present, President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF party has amassed enormous power and controls all key state institutions: the security forces (the military and the police), the judiciary, the media, the civil service (which it has militarised), and the central bank, headed by Gideon Gono, who has literally destroyed the Zimbabwean currency.

One catastrophic mistake made by the Zimbabwean opposition was not seeking to wrestle at least one institution out of the grip of ZANU PF. No popular revolutions since 2000 have succeeded without opposition control of at least one key state institution such as the security forces, the judiciary or the media. The Rose Revolution in Georgia (Nov 2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Nov 2004), and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon (Feb 2005) all succeeded because they had the control or support/sympathy of at least one key state institutions.

Key state institutions

It takes an institution to battle another institution.

At any rate, the ZANU PF controls all key state institutions and governs with impunity. It knows the opposition is weak or ineffective and exploits their weaknesses mercilessly.

In addition, it has assembled young thugs – Green Bombers – to terrorise, intimidate and cow the people. The rule of law is non-existent. ZANU PF holds itself above the law and is answerable only to itself.

Like other African despots, Mugabe refuses to take responsibility for his own stupid failures. These despots frequently use the West, the World Bank, and other external factors  – even earthquakes on Jupiter! – as convenient scapegoats to divert attention from their own scandalous failures.

“President Daniel rap Moi accused the IMF and other development partners of denying Kenya development funds, thus triggering mass poverty” (The Washington Times, June 3, 1999; p.A12).

According to the Chairman of Ghana’s ruling NDC, Issifu Ali, whatever economic crisis the nation is going through has been caused by external factors. “He said the NDC has since 1982 adopted pragmatic policies for the progress of Ghana, adding that the macro-economic environment of 1999 has been undermined by global economic developments" (The Independent, Nov 18, 1999; p.3).

Greedy Western powers

According to the Zimbabwe Independent (April 27, 1999), “Mugabe rejects the criticism of those who blame the government for the economic crisis. It is, he says, the fault of greedy Western powers, the IMF, the Asian financial crisis and the drought” (p. 25). President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe also blames Western sanctions, British colonialists, racists and “snakes” (whites) for ruining his economy.

Even African organisations such as the African Union are also steeped in the externalist orthodoxy. The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) claims that Africa’s impoverishment has been accentuated by the legacy of colonialism and other historical legacies, such as the Cold War and the unjust international economic system.

Colonialism subverted the "traditional structures, institutions and values," creating an economy "subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers" (para 21). Colonialism, according to NEPAD, retarded the development of an entrepreneurial and middle class with managerial capability. At independence, Africa inherited a "weak capitalist class," which explains the "weak accumulation process, weak states and dysfunctional economies." (para 22).

More recent reasons for Africa's dire condition include "its continued marginalisation from globalisation process." (para 2). NEPAD seeks $64 billion in investments from the West.

Now, Libyan leader Muamar Ghaddafi, the chairman of the African Union, says Israel is the cause of Africa’s problems.

Incompetent and corrupt leaders

By the beginning of the new millennium, even Africa’s children were fed up with this “colonialism-imperialism” claptrap. Chernoh Bah, president of the Children's Forum asserted that Africa's socio economic problems are a direct repercussion of incompetent and corrupt political leaders who usurped political office via the gun. "Some blame colonialism for Africa's plight while others blame the continent's harsh climatic conditions. I think the reason is the kind of political systems we have had over the past decades”, he said. (Standard Times [Freetown], April 2, 2003; web posted).

At the United Nations Children's Fund Summit held in May 2002 in New York, youngsters from Africa ripped into their leaders for failing to improve their education and health. "You get loans that will be paid in 20 to 30 years and we have nothing to pay them with, because when you get the money, you embezzle it, you eat it”, said 12-year-old Joseph Tamale from Uganda (BBC News, May 10, 2002).

Prominent Africans also started lashing out at the leadership. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, himself an African, excoriated African leaders at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lome in July 2000. He pointedly told them that they are to blame for most of the continent's problems.

“Instead of being exploited for the benefit of the people, Africa’s mineral resources have been so mismanaged and plundered that they are now the source of our misery” (Daily Graphic, July 12, 2000; p.5).

Earlier in the year at a press conference in London in April, 2000, Kofi Annan, “lambasted African leaders who he says have subverted democracy and lined their pockets with public funds, although he stopped short of naming names” (The African-American Observer, April 25 – May 1, 2000; p.10).

During a brief stop-over in Accra, he disclosed in a Joy FM radio station interview that "Africa is the region giving him the biggest headache as the Security Council spends 60 to 70 percent of its time on Africa. He admitted sadly and that the conflicts on the continent embarrasses and pains him as an African" (The Guide, July 18-24, 2000; p.8).

Blaming outside forces

Ordinary people are speaking out too. Said Akobeng Eric, a Ghanaian, in a letter to the Free Press (29 March - 11 April 1996): "A big obstacle to economic growth in Africa is the tendency to put all blame, failures and shortcomings on outside forces. Progress might have been achieved if we had always tried first to remove the mote in our own eyes" (2).

The African people, fed up at the incompetence of their leaders, started lashing out. Angry at deteriorating economic conditions in Ghana, thousands of Ghanaians marched through the streets of the capital city, Accra, to denounce the ruling regime of President Jerry Rawlings. “If Jerry Rawlings says the current economic crisis is due to external forces and therefore, beyond his control, then he should step aside and allow a competent person who can manage the crisis to take over," Atta Frimpong demanded (The Ghanaian Chronicle, Nov 29, 1999; p.1).

In Zimbabwe, the people did not buy Mugabe’s claim that “Britain, greedy Western powers, the IMF, the Asian financial crisis and the drought” were responsible for the country’s economic mess. They rejected his request for constitutional revisions to give him more draconian powers in a February 15, 2000 referendum, handing him his first political defeat in 20 years of virtually unchallenged rule.

The game is up

United States President Barack Obama echoed these internalist sentiments when he said in Accra on July 11, 2009 that, “the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants.”

The game is up for ZANU PF. It has lost all credibility with the Zimbabwean people. It has become an imposition – a cancer – on Zimbabwe’s body politic – a far cry from the liberation stature it once enjoyed. Fear and paranoia are driving the regime to cling to power at all cost – by force and with brutal repression.

Albert Einstein once defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. The ZANU PF regime has resorted to brutally repressive measures over and over again since independence in 1980 without any improvement in the economy or society.

I call it lunacy. To extricate itself from the mess, ZANU PF has two distinct choices to make. The first is to maintain its hard-line stance and, the second, is to adopt a more conciliatory approach.

1. The hardline approach

The hardline position is invariably a dead end – literally. Africa’s post-colonial history is replete with intransigent autocrats who refused to yield to popular demands for freedom and took hardline positions:

President Marcias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (1979): His dictatorship was one of the most repressive regimes in Africa. Of the tiny population of 300 000, thousands of people were eliminated. All prominent politicians and intellectuals were either killed or driven into exile. Eventually, he was killed by his own cousin, Lt.-Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who is still president in a tenure no better than his uncle’s.

Field Marshal Idi Amin of Uganda (1979): He also called himself the “Conqueror of the British Empire.” His lunatic antics and cruelties need no elaboration. He was eventually ousted from power by President Julius Nyerere who sent Tanzanian troops over the border into Uganda. Amin fled into exile in Saudi Arabia, where he perished.

Milton Obote of Uganda (1986): He was ousted from power by a rebel movement led by Yoweri Museveni, the current president.

General Samuel Doe of Liberia (1990): A rebel leader cornered him and cut off his left ear. He bled to death.

General Moussa Traore of Mali (1991): On March 18, 1991, angry Malians took to the streets to demand democratic freedom from the despotic rule of Moussa Traore. He unleashed his security forces on them, killing scores, including women and children. But pro-democracy forces were not deterred and kept up the pressure. Asked to resign on March 25, he retorted: "I will not resign, my government will not resign, because I was elected not by the opposition but by all the people of Mali! But two days later when he tried to flee the country, he was grabbed by his own security agents and sent to jail. From there, he lamented: "My fate is now in God's hands."

General Siad Barre of Somalia (1991): Even though Somalia is ethnically homogenous, his rule was particularly cruel. He played one clan against another and even went as far as dropping bombs on clan leaders who opposed his rule. Eventually, he was routed by forces loyal to Mohamed Farar Aideed. Barre fled Somalia in a tank that ran out of gas near the Kenya border. He eventually made his way to Nigeria where he died in exile.

Comrade Haile Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia (1991): Despite having Africa’s largest army with 200 000 soldiers, he was ousted from power by a rag-tag band of determined Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels. His soldiers could not protect him. In fact, many of them defected to the rebels side with their weapons. He fled into exile in Harare, Zimbabwe. And how safe was he in Zimbabwe? In 1996, an Eritrean, Solomon Haile Ghebre Michael, tried to assassinate him. ZANU PF officials should be speaking with him.

General Juvenal Habryamana of Rwanda (1994): His plan, returning from peace talks with opposition parties in Tanzania, was blown up or shot down by hardliners within his own administration, triggering an orgy of violence and mayhem that resulted in the slaughter of more than 1 million Tutsis.

General Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (1996): He changed his name to “Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga”, which, in the local Lingala language, meant, "The rooster who leaves no chicken untouched.” A rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, chased him out of his coop into exile in Morocco, where he died. Hundreds of Mobutu’s soldiers also joined the rebel forces. Subsequently, Kabila himself was shot dead by this own security detail.

The list is long but the above should suffice. In all cases, it is instructive to note that the threat to the despotic regime did not come from opposition parties. It came from:

1.    Within the despot’s own security apparatus or circle of officers and family members (Obiang, Abacha, Habryamana, Traore),

2.    Rebel groups (Obote, Mengistu, Barre, Doe, Mobutu Sese Seko

3.    Invasion from a neighboring country (Idi Amin).

Threat to ZANU PF

Clearly, the threat to the ZANU PF regime is not going to come from the opposition parties. The threat to ZANU PF is more likely to come from within or from a rebel insurgency.

Rebel insurgencies start when the political process breaks down. When the politicians talk and talk and fail to resolve a crisis, a frustrated leader may “take to the bush” and pick up guns.

The insurgency often starts with a small band of determined rebels from the country-side, where government troops are thinly spread. The troops are often concentrated in the capital city to repel any challenge to the despot in power.

It is relatively cheap to start a rebellion. "The late Laurent Kabila, who overthrew the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, once boasted that all he needed to mount a revolution was $10 000 and a satellite telephone" (The Economist, May 24, 2003; p.24).

As it turned out, Kabila was bank-rolled by Rwanda. ZANU PF should not delude itself into thinking that Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia or some neighboring country would not finance and support a rebel movement.

Rag-tag malcontents

Nonetheless, it takes only a small band of determined rag-tag malcontents to plunge the country into mayhem. Back in 1983, Museveni of Uganda set out with a rag-tag band of only 27 rebels in a guerrilla campaign against Obote. Charles Taylor of Liberia started out with about 150 rebels; the late Mohamed Farah Aidid of Somalia began with 200 rebels; and Paul Kagame of Rwanda set out with less than 250.

Rebel leaders set their sights on only one destination – the capital city, the seat of government or power. As they advance inexorably toward the capital city, their ranks swell with deserting government troops, as well as restless and unemployed youth, who sense an opportunity for jobs and riches through pillage and plunder. Some, like child soldiers, are forcibly recruited into the rebel movement. The fighting escalates as rebel soldiers close in on the capital city.

A bitter lesson in the post-colonial era is that no African government has successfully put down a rebel insurgency. Unpaid and demoralised government troops (loyalists in the case of the Ivory Coast), often abandon posts or join the rebels (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Zaire).

The despot may attempt to flee and be grabbed at the airport (Moussa Traore), or succeed and run out of gas (Siad Barre) or die in exile (Mobutu).

It should be abundantly clear to ZANU PF hard-knocks that the hardline position is really a death wish.

2. The conciliatory approach

As stated earlier, Africans are forgiving people. They are willing to forgive those who have harmed them if the culprits are willing to admit their errors and make amends. Political leaders who were willing to yield to the popular will and make amends saved not only themselves but their countries as well. There are many examples: Cape Verde Islands, Benin, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda.

These countries followed African’s own indigenous system of crisis resolution.

When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief will call a village meeting and put the issue before the people. It will be debated until a consensus is reached. Once reached, all, including the chief, are required to abide by it.

In recent years, this indigenous African tradition was revived by pro-democracy forces in the form of "national conferences" to chart a new political future in the countries listed above.

Benin's nine-day "national conference" began on 19 February 1990, with 488 delegates, representing various political, religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of Beninois society.

Sovereign power

The conference, whose chairman was Father Isidore de Souza, held "sovereign power" and its decisions were binding on all, including the government. It stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled multiparty elections that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule.

In South Africa, the vehicle used to make that difficult but peaceful transition to a multiracial democratic society was the Convention for a Democratic South Africa. It began deliberations in July 1991, with 228 delegates drawn from about 25 political parties and various anti-apartheid groups.

The de Klerk government made no effort to "control" the composition of CODESA. Political parties were not excluded; not even ultra right-wing political groups, although they chose to boycott its deliberations.

CODESA strove to reach a "working consensus" on an interim constitution and set a date for the March 1994 elections. It established the composition of an interim or transitional government that would rule until the elections were held.

More important, CODESA was "sovereign." Its decisions were binding on the de Klerk government. De Klerk could not abrogate any decision made by CODESA – just as the African chief could not disregard any decision arrived at the village meeting.

Zimbabwe can pull itself from the brink by holding a “sovereign national conference” – not just craft a Global Political Agreement (GPA). That approach is flawed because it excludes civil society – teacher’s groups, student groups, church groups, women groups, etc. It is for this reason – the exclusion of civil society groups – why governments of national unity (GNU) have never worked in Africa.

The choice before ZANU PF is stark clear: It can maintain its hardline stance or adopt a conciliatory approach. Their own survival and that of Zimbabwe will depend on which choice they make. There are plenty of lessons to draw from on the African continent.