OPINION: Zimbabwe’s economy is in tatters. The statistics are appalling: unemployment hovers around 80 percent and the economy has shrunk to a third of what it was at independence in 1980.

Until formation of a unity government between President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai in February, delivery of basic social services such as health care, sanitation, electricity, clean water and education has been virtually non-existent.

Over the past decade the economy has been on an unprecedented free-fall leading to massive suffering among the people, who have become disenchanted with the catastrophic failure of leadership and disillusioned with the promise of liberation.

This horrid tale of betrayal is well known to Zimbabweans and does not need belabouring. The more pertinent issue is how the southern African country extricates itself from this terrible situation and becomes prosperous again.

Change or reform in any society can come from several sources. The conventional agents of change are:

1.    The leader, the government or regime in power,

2.    The politicians – both ruling party MPs and the opposition MPs.

3.    The Intellectual class,

4.    Civil society groups

5.    The people

There has been a catastrophic failure of leadership in Zimbabwe. Once hailed as a liberation hero, Mugabe has transformed himself into a murderous despot.

When Nigeria’s military dictator, the late General Sani Abacha (“The Butcher of Abuja”) hanged Ken Saro Wiwa, leader of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta in December 1995, Mugabe called Nigeria a “disgrace” and worked assiduously to have Nigeria thrown out of the Commonwealth.

Abacha who died in 1998, brooked no nonsense and crushed any opposition to his tyrannical rule with merciless abandon.

Disgrace to black people

The irony of this story is that Mugabe, who denounced Abacha as a “disgrace” has himself become a disgrace to black people. In power for 29 years, he has ruined a once-prosperous economy, crushed the opposition and sent more than 3 million of his own people into exile.

Yet Mugabe refuses to take responsibility for his own failures, preferring to blame “greedy Western nations,” the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and “snakes” (whites) for his problems. He is totally and utterly imperious to reason. He is stone deaf and shockingly blind.

Just as a leopard cannot change his spots, Mugabe cannot change his proclivities. He has always harboured a deep contempt and hatred for the West and democracy. At independence in 1980, he vowed to transform Zimbabwe into a Marxist-Leninist state.

But what has Marxism-Leninism got to do with Africa? Even an idiot could see clearly that Marx and Lenin were not black Africans.

Mugabe’s then Defence Minister Enos Nkala – who, intoxicated by the exercise of power – was often given to vituperative utterances and erratic behaviour. In November 1980, barely six months after independence, Nkala told a rally in Bulawayo, that ZANU PF's main task was to crush Joshua Nkomo.

In a series of speeches in September, 1985, Nkala spoke of his intention to crush ZAPU: "Let me assure the nation that the policy of reconciliation toward ZAPU has been withdrawn," he told the Senate on 18 September. "Nkomo should take note – in the next few weeks you'll be seeing fire . . . We want to wipe out the ZAPU leadership. You've only seen the warning lights. We haven't yet reached full blast. I don't want to hear pleas of mercy . . . My instinct tells me that when you deal with ruthless gangsters you have to be ruthless. I have locked up a few honorable members (of Parliament) and I think they will have a rest for a long time to come before they reappear to continue their dissident activities."

Matabeleland massacres

Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade, trained by North Korean military instructors, was responsible for the Matabeleland massacres in which more than 20 000 Ndebele people were slaughtered.

In the July 1985 elections Mugabe could not conceal his contempt for the Zimbabwean constitution. He referred to it as "that dirty piece of paper".

The elections took place amid relative calm, but when they were over, mobs of ZANU PF supporters rampaged through the suburbs of Harare to brutalise supporters of the opposition. Homes were raided, and furniture and household possessions were thrown out into the streets. The thugs declared the houses to be ZANU PF property.

As the violence intensified, victims were beaten and pummelled to the point of unconsciousness, their belongings stolen, and their houses set on fire. More than six people were reported killed.

A defeated ZAPU candidate, Simon Chauruka, was gruesomely hacked to death with axes when a mob of ZANU PF supporters attacked his home in the Dzivarasekwa suburb. Another ZAPU candidate, Kenneth Mano, who had just been released from detention, was stabbed three times. More than 200 ZAPU officials, including members of parliament, were detained without charge under the emergency powers after the July elections.

As early as 1982, corruption scandals were rocking the country. Edgar Tekere, a maverick and also a nationalist who fought alongside Mugabe for Zimbabwe's independence, decided to fight against this incipient "Swiss bank" socialism.

He declared: "We all came from Mozambique with nothing; not even a teaspoon. But today, in less than two years, you hear that so-and-so owns so many farms, a chain of hotels and his father owns a fleet of buses. Where did all that money come from in such a short period? Isn't it from the very public funds they are entrusted to administer?" (New African, March 1989; p. 21).

Incorrigible autocrat

Fast forward to 2009, 29 years of Mugabe’s rule and it is the same old incorrigible autocrat. The old leopard hasn’t changed its spots. Change is unlikely to come from him. It is even doubtful if he is in control. He is just a “hostage president”; the “securocrats” are in control. 

After his resounding defeat in the March 29 elections, Mugabe was reportedly willing to accept defeat and step down. He is said to have told his security officials that he had lost the election and was going to step down. 

But the security chiefs stepped in – a “palace coup”. Fearful that they would lose wealth and influence if Mugabe bowed out, Zimbabwe’s military chief, General Constantine Chiwenga, reportedly told Mugabe that stepping down from power was not a decision he alone should make.

The military would take control of the country and keep him in office or Mugabe could contest the run-off election, which would be directed in the field by senior army officers supervising a military-style campaign against the opposition to ensure that Mugabe wins. Mugabe agreed to the second option, which was codenamed, CIBD: Coercion, Intimidation, Beating, Displacement.

At an April 4, 2008 meeting of ZANU PF party, the plan was affirmed. “The small piece of paper cannot take the country,” said Solomon Mujuru, a former guerrilla commander, who once headed Zimbabwe’s military (The Washington Post, July 5, 2008; p.A10). 

A Joint Operations Command (JOC) was set up to direct the election campaign, intimidating rural voters and assassinating opposition campaign supporters. Emmerson Mnagagwa chairs the JOC which is made up of these military generals: Chiwenga, head of defence forces, Perence Shiri, head of the air force, and Philip Sibanda, head of the national army.

Presidential aspirant Mnangagwa, also known as the “Butcher of Matabeleland,” is known for his uncompromising stance and ruthlessness. He was the Minister of State Security who orchestrated a systematic and brutal 1981-83 campaign to suppress the Ndebele people and wipe out the main opposition, ZAPU and its leader, the late Joshua Nkomo.

The hierarchy of ZANU PF has fully been “militarised” or integrated with the security apparatus.

Dripping in blood

It is fear of reprisals, retribution and paranoia which haunts the ruling ZANU PF regime. They know they have done bad. Their hands are dripping in blood and their pockets are full of booty. They are afraid that all their gory misdeeds will be exposed once they are out of power. 

So they must do everything they can to cling to power. They must crush the opposition and ruthlessly silence any whiff of protest. But in doing so, they dig deeper graves for themselves because these brutal tactics seldom work.

Africa has dealt with many brutal despots before. In 1990, Liberian rebel leader Yormie Johnson finally cornered General Samuel Doe in his presidential palace. He stripped Doe naked, tied him up and cut off his left ear. He didn’t listen to his people. Doe bled to death. In 2000, Democratic Republic Of Congo (DRC) President Laurent Kabila was shot dead by his own security guard.

African tyrants spend an inordinate amount on an elaborate security-cum-military structure to protect themselves and suppress their people. Since they came to power through illegitimate means (a military coup or stolen election), they are suspicious of everyone and paranoid of any little event, however innocuous. 

Layers of security

So they spend huge resources creating layers upon layers of security – just in case one level fails – and shower security agents with perks and amenities. But in the end, they are hoisted by their own petards – overthrown by their own security apparatus.

In Nigeria, former dictator, Gen Ibrahim Babangida rewarded "nearly 3 000 of his most loyal military chiefs by giving them new Peugeot sedans. Most Nigerians will never be able to afford anything like a new Peugeot 505, which costs the equivalent of US$21 000 in Lagos. A senior university professor, for example, earns about US$4 000 a year, while a nurse or mechanic is lucky to bring home more than US$1 000" (The New York Times, Dec 2, 1993; p. A3).

But they can't trust the military completely because some soldier might get the same idea of staging a coup. So they create a Special Division Force (like the 64th Battalion Rawlings created in Ghana), and equip it with better weapons than the ordinary soldiers so that the Special Force can put down any uprising or coup attempt from the military.

Still, they can't trust the Special Division Force, so they create an Elite Strike Force (like the commandos), which are directly answerable to the president. Even then, that is cold comfort. So they create the Presidential Guard, often drawn from members of their own tribe, and equip it with the best weapons. To deal with threats that may come from the people, they create various militias – Janjaweed in Sudan and Green Bombers in Zimbabwe. 

Many African military regimes in Africa have elite presidential guard. As The Washington Post (July 23, 1994) reported:

"The (presidential) guard is a typical feature of undemocratic sub-Saharan African regimes – a coup deterring force recruited for its personal loyalty to the commander in chief. A 1 500-man brigade of guards in Nigeria's inland capital, Abuja, and a similar-sized force in Lagos, the country's commercial capital, are described by military sources as the linchpin of Abacha's internal security apparatus.

As in other undemocratic African countries, Abacha's presidential guard is drawn from his own ethnic group in his home town. The guards often get the best equipment and the best training" (p.A16).

As Africa's infrastructure and public services disintegrated, African dictators found the wherewithal to spend more and more on themselves and the military. Whitaker (1988) noted, "The proportion of African funds going to equip and pay the military has been steadily rising, reaching for example over 40 percent in Ethiopia, and 25 and 20 percent respectively in drought-ravaged Mauritania and Mali" (p. 43).

Inadequate protection

The problem is, the security system, quite apart from the threat that can come from within, often fails to provide adequate protection to African despots. In fact, quite often, it is the very same security apparatus that overthrows them. The Asante have this proverb: If a bed bug bites you, it is from your own cloth.

The late Samuel Doe of Liberia, for example, spent so much to keep his soldiers happy. In addition, he had crack presidential troops, secretly trained by the Israelis. But they could not protect him from the Charles Taylor's rag-tag rebels of 1 000. Note that Charles Taylor was not even a soldier but an ex-civil servant.

Similarly, Ethiopia’s Haile Mariam Mengistu spent an enormous amount to build Africa's largest army with 200 000 under arms. Neither they too could protect Mengistu from a band of determined Eritrean and Tigray rebels. The same can be said for Siad Barre of Somalia.

In 1974, Mengistu overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in a military coup. The ailing emperor was suffocated with a wet pillow, and his body buried in an unmarked grave. Scores of his relatives were murdered or chained to walls in the cellars of the imperial palace. Thousands of suspected counter-revolutionaries were gunned down in the streets. More than 30 000 people were jailed.

When a member of his own junta questioned the wisdom of such terror tactics, Mengistu shot him in the head. Mengistu created one of Africa's largest militaries but in 1991, he fled to Zimbabwe after being routed by a rag-tag army of Eritrean rebels. How safe was he there?

Former Ethiopian dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam panicked and ran yelling for help when a would-be assassin fired a single shot at one of his guards last fall, a Zimbabwe court was told. The Eritrean suspect, Solomon Haile Ghebre Michael, 36, pleaded not guilty Monday in the attack on the exiled Col Mengistu, given asylum by President Robert Mugabe in 1991 after he fled Ethiopia (The Washington Times, Thursday July 11, 1996; p.A10).

Trusted colleagues

On July 29, 1975, General Gowon of Nigeria was overthrown in a bloodless coup, planned and executed by some of his most trusted colleagues, including the Commander of the Presidential Guard. Interestingly, General Joe Garba, who announced the overthrow, was Gowon's closest personal staff in whom he could confide in all matters of security.

Ironically, reasons for the coup against Gowon were: inaccessibility, insensitivity, indecision and lack of political direction. Strange that his own closest aide had no access to him.

In Cameroon, Mbia Meka, the senior commissioner of police and the commandant of the paramilitary Special Operations Squad, as well as Joseph Owona, and Remy Ze Meka, secretary general at the prime minister's office, were arrested on Sept 9, 1994 and charged with plotting to overthrow Paul Biya.

"The revelations stunned Cameroonians since the alleged coup leaders were all members of Biya's own Beti ethnic group and, as part of the powerful Essingan sect, were held in close confidence by the 61-year old president" (The African Observer, Nov 15-28, 1994; p.14).

In Chad, part of the rebellion against President Idris Deby is led by his own family members.

In Rwanda, the late president Juvenal Habryimana "fell victim to the monster he created" (The Washington Post, April 18, 1995; p.A17). His plane crash was plotted by his own allies in the military, who saw that he was edging closer to political reforms that would threaten their power.

Inner workings

But the next buffoon doesn't learn. Being a product of that structure, with intricate knowledge of its inner workings, he repairs the weaknesses and strengthens the structure. Eventually he too is overthrown by the same security apparatus.

In Niger, General Ibrahim Mainassara, who seized power in a coup in 1996, didn't trust his own military, so he created a Special Presidential Guard and fortified his palace. It was impregnable but just in case somebody might have an idea of attacking from the air, he gave his presidential guard some heavy artillery, including heavy-duty anti-helicopter machine guns.

Sometime in 1999, returning from a trip overseas, his presidential guard went to the airport to meet him. They opened fire with their anti-helicopter machine guns. Mainassara's body was shredded into pieces, littering the tarmac.

The more an African head of state spends on security, the more likely he will be overthrown by someone from his security forces.

Each year, African governments spend about $12 billion on the importation of weapons and maintenance of the military. The futility of such military expenditures was pointed out by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Speaking in Accra on November 25, 1990, he noted cogently: "Freedom is cheaper than repression. When you are a leader chosen by the people you don't need security. All the money spent on weapons doesn't buy one iota of security," he said (Christian Messenger, Jan 1991; p. 1).

“I bought jet fighters. I bought MiG-23s. I bought armed helicopters. And I lost the war. When there’s social unrest, it’s difficult to win. It’s the same feeling today,” said Likulia Bolongo, the defence minister of Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko during the 1996-1997 war (The Washington Post, Nov 23, 1999; p.A24).

On August 2, 2005, Mauritania's army officers overthrew President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya in a bloodless revolt. Speaking after the coup, Taya said he had been shocked to find out who was behind it. He was toppled by the former security chief and close colleague, Colonel Ely Ould Mohammed Vall, who had been the director of national security since 1987 and, after played a key role in the 1984 coup which brought Taya to power.

"My situation reminds me of the old adage: 'God, save me from my friends, I'll take care of my enemies'," Taya told Radio France Internationale from Niger. "I was stunned by the coup d'etat [...] and even more so when I heard who were the authors," Taya said (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4126296.stm).

The ZANU PF regime, in contemplating its imminent demise, should ask itself whether more investments in lethal weaponry and brutal repression will pay off.

Africans are forgiving people but are willing to forgive those who are willing to admit of their errors and make amends. This African trait can be found in indigenous African courts. Western law is different from African law.

African notion of justice

Western jurisprudence focuses on punishment for the guilty whereas the African notion of justice mandates restitution, forgiveness, reconciliation to promote social healing and restore social harmony. Africans believe that when two people fight, the entire village is affected. Therefore, conflict resolution requires not just a settlement between the two disputants but also an effort to repair frayed social relationships (social healing). 

In Rwanda, after the 1994 genocide which saw the slaughter of more than 800 000 Tutsis, the government found that the formal (Western) court system would never be able to try the over 100 000 suspects. It would have taken at least 200 years. To restore peace, reconciliation, and justice, the government turned to the traditional courts – gacaca.

According to The Economist (May 17, 2003), “They got off to a flying start: In Oct 2001, Rwandans elected 258 208 gacaca judges, including 19 for each of the country’s 9 170 cells (tiny administrative united sometimes as small as 200 people).

The people in each cell are supposed to assemble before these judges on a patch of grass (gacaca). By hearing testimony from everyone who was there during the genocide, the judges are supposed to identify the culprits, and then pass judgment on them” (p.42). Culprits who confessed to lesser crimes and were willing to make to make amends to their victims, were forgiven.

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established after the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, was rooted in this African tradition. If every white person, guilty of apartheid crimes, were to be punished according to the Western notion of justice, there would be few whites left in South Africa.

Zimbabwe is not going to be saved if those who have perpetrated heinous atrocities and crime, stubbornly refuse to admit their errors.

To be continued. – ZimOnline