OPINION: Zimbabwe is at a defining moment in its history and the importance of locating sustainable and credible exit avenues to the current crisis cannot be overstated.

There is no doubt that nature, content, character and causes of the political and economic crisis will continue to be a subject of discussion for a long time to come.

President Mugabe genuinely believes that he bears absolutely no responsibility for causing the crisis and instead would like to be remembered for being the last defender of sovereignty.

He is not alone in framing the crisis as a consequence of the manipulation of the West. It appears that the majority of the African leaders subscribe to the same values, beliefs and principles that are held by Mugabe.

Having framed the Zimbabwe problem as an externally generated one, it is not surprising that ZANU PF’s politburo has put its own litmus test on what is to be negotiated by the SADC-mediated talks in Pretoria.

Notwithstanding the support of the African Union, and the Chinese and Russian veto; a proper reading of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the ruling ZANU PF party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) reveals that all the contesting parties are at one in holding the view that sanctions, however construed, do present a stumbling block to the turnaround of the economy.

It is also evident that the AU, China and Russia have no alternative economic rescue plan for Zimbabwe.

Equally, in as much as President Thabo Mbeki may be useful in the resolution of the political crisis, there is no evidence that South Africa will be relevant in resolving the economic crisis other than being an intermediary between the very forces that Mugabe is denigrating and the potentially post-Pretoria unified Zimbabwean constituency.

The mere fact that the agenda for the talks includes the sanctions issue, confirms that the views of the Eurpean Union and the United States will be material in moving the country forward. 

Accordingly, it is would not be right to seek to argue that the solution to the crisis must come from Zimbabweans.

Although Mugabe has sought to argue that opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai is an agent of the West, it cannot be correct to hold the view that the targeted sanctions were imposed solely to assert the political rights of Tsvangirai and that all is well in Zimbabwe were it not for the imposition of targeted sanctions. 

It must be accepted that the West must have its own reservations about the sensibility and rationality of any outcome that will leave Mugabe at the helm while accepting that his views of the rule of law and respect for property rights are not at the core of the crisis. 

Even after the signing of the MOU, it is evident that Mugabe is still unrepentant and continues to hold the view that his own view on property rights and rule of law must prevail. 

What he is expecting from the West after using Mbeki to co-opt the opposition into some government of national unity (GNU) framework is the sanctions to be lifted and the good times to roll back. 

He does not believe that a change in policies like what Frelimo had to do to remain relevant is required.

By emphasising the sovereignty and national questions, it is obvious that by boxing the MDC factions into a corner, ZANU PF hopes that a new consensus may emerge from the negotiations that sanctions must be removed with no significant change in economic policies. 

However, it appears that the EU and the US are quite clear about what kind of Zimbabwe they expect to see hence the imposition of further sanctions while the negotiations are under way just to demonstrate to the negotiators that a lot more than a political settlement is expected and urgently required. 

If the negotiations produce an absurd outcome in which Mugabe can continue to use the state to undermine the rule of law and property rights, there is no doubt that sanctions will not be lifted notwithstanding any political accommodation that may be reached between the parties.

The future of the country is now squarely in the hands of five men and one woman in a secret location in South Africa. We now know that ZANU PF is already preparing the world for a predictable outcome of the negotiations. 

A careful reading of Charamba’s opinion piece that was published by the Herald on Saturday, 26 July 2008, entitled: “Dining Tsvangirai, Deigning the British” will reveal that an investment is being made to alienate Tsvangirai from his so-called sponsors.

The world now knows that Mugabe had lunch with Tsvangirai after the signing of the MOU and that there may be more personal engagements to come between the two.

Mugabe has previously and consistently characterised Tsvangirai as a puppet and, therefore, lacking any Zimbabwean values and principles as defined by ZANU PF. 

There may be many in ZANU PF including Charamba who may not be happy with the rapprochement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai because they have invested in building a fortress of lies and conspiracy theories around Mugabe’s world.

Charamba makes the point in his article that Tsvangirai received swapped briefcases just before the signing and states as fact that he was a beneficiary of a speech from third parties who can only be British or American. 

By making this kind of allegation, there is no doubt that the real audience for such speculative journalism is Mugabe. 

Charamba fully knows that the most reliable source of information and intelligence for Mugabe is the Herald and sister papers under the control of the state. 

There can be no doubt that Charamba uses the media to shape Mugabe’s world view and by providing manipulated evidence, the intention is to continue to condemn Mugabe to ignorance while the country is burning and the economy imploding. 

In a predictable manner, the Zimbabwean public including Mugabe is now told by Charamba that there were two white men who tried to gate crash the signing ceremony. Messrs Armin Rabitsch and Keith Scott were identified as the two white persons. 

We are then told that Rabitsch gave the game away by exclaiming: "They signed the wrong document! Representatives of negotiating parties should have been five, not two." 

Charamba knows his principal’s appetite for conspiracy theories and by suggesting that Tsvangirai was a mere pawn in the game, an impression is then created in the mind of Mugabe that he should not take Tsvangirai as a serious interlocutor in the resolution of the crisis. 

By suggesting and providing self-serving evidence that Tsvangirai has no mind of his own, a position strongly held by Mugabe, the propaganda machinery is then expected to gather its own momentum and effectively make sure that negotiations are steered in a predictable manner. 

Even the suggestion by Tsvangirai to expand the mediation team given the complexity of the issues involved was easily dismissed as a demonstration of foreign influence. In other words, the agenda should be monopolised by ZANU PF.

Charamba also makes the case that there are fractures within the MDC-T as if to suggest that any views that Tsvangirai may have should not be taken as representative of the party he leads. He laments the fact that the media has failed to report such fractures without explaining for whose benefit such reporting would be. 

According to Charamba, Zimbabweans through the negotiating parties must affirm the correctness and irrevocability of land reforms as well as British obligations to the resolution of this politically manipulated issue.

While Charamba accepts that ZANU PF was not ready for the March 29 elections, he still holds the view that MDC won because of the external help that it allegedly received. No mention is made of the role of the state in assisting ZANU PF in its election campaign as well as Charamba’s own role in using the state machinery and time to propagate partisan views.

Charamba makes the point that the lunch between Tsvangirai and Mugabe was only possible because the British were prevented from attending the meeting.

Why would it be wrong for the British to have a say if they are expected to pay for the land reform programme?

Equally, it is not apparent from Charamba how he expects sanctions to be lifted without engaging the parties who have imposed them? 

The risks of recidivism in Tsvangirai are described by Charamba as significant given the characterisation of him as a mere surrogate of the West. 

Tsvangirai is on record as saying that he is committed to a political settlement but what is evident is that he is increasingly being boxed into a corner with people like Charamba acting like icons of political and revolutionary morality. 

We know that to Charamba, Zimbabwe is less secure without Mugabe and he makes no effort to explain how a Zimbabwean solution mediated by Mbeki in camera that will only deal with who is in and out of the GNU will bring a brighter and better day to Zimbabwe. 

Mugabe had 28 years to create a better and prosperous Zimbabwe less blinded by race but challenged by its future. 

Regrettably, it must be accepted that the Zimbabwe of today is not what the independence deal was supposed to bring into existence but reflects a bitter and poisonous harvest. It would, therefore, be absurd to accept any outcome that will fortify the status quo ante. 

Evidence is available confirming that the intended results of the land reform programme have not been realised.

If evicted white farmers have helped to change the Zambian agricultural landscape to the extent that in less than a generation, the country is now a net exporter, it is important that the assumptions that Charamba uses to arrive at conclusions meant to perpetuate the ignorance of Mugabe be openly interrogated. 

The West should have no disability in asserting its views on the Zimbabwean question if Zimbabweans themselves by putting sanctions removal as a core objective of the talks have accepted the need for the West’s buy-in on the deal. 

It is apparent in the aftermath of the Security Council veto on the sanctions resolution; we have not seen any evidence of the Chinese, Russian and African economic rescue package in the making. 

Mbeki will not come to the economic rescue of Zimbabwe notwithstanding the fact that people of Zimbabwean origin are financing the South African government through taxes. 

An argument has been made that Mugabe is the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai chose to withdraw from the run-off elections because he was afraid of the inevitable.

There is no doubt that Mugabe has been sufficiently fed with propaganda that there was no violence, if anything, the reported violence was being inspired by former Rhodesians. By feeding Mugabe with such propaganda, the consequences are predictable.

To the extent that Tsvangirai has now a direct line to Mugabe, he needs to act quickly before the likes of Charamba and the forces that managed the run-off elections quickly regroup.

The mere fact that Mugabe could not even get an opportunity to meet with Tsvangirai for a decade demonstrates that Mugabe may in reality be a prisoner of the state that he purports to be in charge of.

It is evident that Mugabe has been convinced by his own colleagues that he should have a residual interest in remaining in power precisely to protect his legacy as a liberator. 

As an astute politician who fully knows the risks of relinquishing power while US President George Bush is still in office, there is no way that he would accept an outcome that will leave him with significantly reduced powers. 

Obviously being oblivious of the abuse of state power by various individuals, Mugabe holds the view that he is still popular and the people of Zimbabwe have no interest in the rule of law and respect for property rights. 

The opposition has failed to exploit the evidence that shows that Mugabe’s regime has also been brutal to blacks particularly on property rights and governance issues. 

Mugabe will continue to make the case that he is the only reliable custodian and that white property rights should be perishable and disposable. 

Using the same construction, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, who is leading the ZANU PF negotiating team, is one of the most renowned custodians of injustice and has presided over the passage of the most draconian pieces of legislation that offend any democratic and constitutional order.

Ordinarily, given Chinamasa’s record, he should have been disqualified from any serious negotiations about the country’s democratic future.

However, Mugabe finds himself with very few legal minds that can defend his policies and programmes other than people like Chinamasa and his fellow Tsholotsho mafia. 

Will Zimbabwe turn a new leaf from the negotiations?

There can be no basis for a government of national unity with people who believe that they can be judges in their own cause. 

The argument that Mugabe’s victims are only white does not hold any water. It is clear that the values, principles and beliefs that informed the liberation struggle are no longer applicable. 

Instead of the rule of law we now have the rule by a few men (including Charamba, Chinamasa, Gideon Gono, etc) with Mugabe increasingly playing the role of a naked emperor less protected by his troops but by a dangerous nostalgic connection to a revolution whose prosecution has gone fundamentally wrong. 

Will Mugabe rise to the occasion by realising that the real enemies of sovereignty may not be the opposition but his so-called handlers? 

Will Mugabe finally realise that he is no longer in control of a state that has decayed to the extent that no rational person would decide to lift sanctions without a regime or significant change? 

Now that Tsvangirai can at least talk to Mugabe, so much hope is now on him to inform, educate, and enlighten Mugabe on the futility of defending an administration that has no centre of gravity and whose moral compass is questionable. – ZimOnline